embarked on procedural changes at both the federal and state levels. The effort has achieved more than procedural tinkering at the edges, creating some base-level changes at the constitutional and statutory level in the legal machinery that responds to crime.
Many characterize this procedural transformation as a shift from an inquisitorial to an adversarial model of criminal procedure. I suggest, however, that the reforms do not simply endorse the strengths of a particular adversarial fact-finding method. Rather, the principal virtue of the new criminal codes in Mexico turn on their efforts to balance powers. In particular, the codes create meaningful competition for the public prosecutors in Mexico during the investigation, trial, and punishment of alleged criminals.
The drug violence in Mexico and the revision of state and federal criminal codes in that country are both stories that deserve intense scrutiny, standing alone. Taken together, they are riveting. This article will review these developments and consider the connections between them, both in the past and the future. Looking back, did one development cause the other, or did they both flow from a single cause? Looking forward, will the procedural reform make it easier to respond to the drug violence? Or will the drug violence distort or disable the procedural reform?
Writ large, these two developments in Mexico raise this basic challenge for lawyers everywhere: Does procedure matter at all in conditions of extreme violence and disorder? Does a debate about adversarial versus inquisitorial justice amid ghastly violence resemble a debate about iPods versus other MP3 players in a household where nobody has enough to eat? Alternatively, is an orderly and legitimate procedure the best hope under extreme conditions of disorder?
II. Recent Drug Violence in Mexico
The troubles of the Mexican criminal justice system date back http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicoroadfailed_state; see also [Vol. XXXV to the earliest days of the nation. 3 The events that capture our attention at present, however, began with the national presidential election campaign of 2006. Three candidates represented the three major parties in the effort to succeed Vincente Fox. Felipe Calder6n, like Fox, was the nominee of the National Action Party (the Partido Acci6n Nacional, or PAN), a right-of-center party. 4 The Democratic Revolution Party (the Partido de la Revoluci6n Democrdtica, or PRD), a left-of-center party, nominated Andrds Manuel L6pez Obrador. 5 Roberto Madrazo represented the Institutional Revolutionary Party (the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI). 6 The election presented a novel experience for the voters, because the PRI had dominated Mexican politics for most of the twentieth century. 7 After Vincente Fox broke the political monopoly of the PRI, familiar political truths in Mexico no longer applied.
Calder6n won an extremely close election, amid reports of voting irregularities. 8 The PRD disputed the legitimacy of this outcome, and Obrador refused to recognize Calder6n as President. 9 As a result of the extended turmoil after the election, Calder6n believed that he needed to take some unifying actions early in his tenure. He moved against drug cartels to create a sense of law and order that many voters were missing.
The new President's offensive against the cartels faced daunting odds. " [Drug] leaders spent a portion of their wealth bribing police, mayors, and some higher-level officials, including some who worked in the customs service and others in the prison system. 11 Even in the army, considered less corrupt than the police, "defense officials estimated that 100,000 soldiers have quit to join cartels over the previous seven years." 12 President Calder6n himself received death threats from cartels during the election campaign, suggesting that the new President held a personal commitment to this policy priority. 13 Because the cartels' bribery of the police remained a pervasive problem, Calder6n was unable to call on existing structures of law enforcement. 14 Instead, he sent the army into the fight, devoting more than 40,000 troops to the effort. 15 Mexico started extraditing record numbers of drug suspects to the United States for trial, revealing the loss of confidence of political leaders in the Mexican judicial system. 16 The military offensive against the drug cartels offered some early positive results. The campaign produced record seizures of drugs, money, and guns, along with tens of thousands of arrests which depleted the ranks of the four main Mexican drug cartels. 17 Mexican authorities announced in April 2009 that they had arrested over 60,000 people for drug crimes over the past two years. 18 The government claimed to have reduced the number of "zones of impunity" from 2,204 down to 233."9 Enforcement efforts against cartels uncovered a large number of high-level officials and police officers who had collaborated in criminal enterprises. 2°D rug organizations traffic in violence, and the cartels responded violently to the government's offensive. There were 6,200 drug-related killings in 2008 (double the number of drugrelated killings in 2007). : l Some of these killings involved multiple executions or mutilations of the victims' bodies. 22 Some of the deaths were attributed to intra-organization discipline, while others resulted from struggles among the major cartels. 23 Many of the killings, however, targeted law enforcement agents, along with a few killings of civilian bystanders. 24 Soldiers in Mexico started to cover their faces while on patrol, because their families faced retribution if the drug traffickers recognized them. 25 The Mexican army allowed soldiers to grow their hair longer, so they were not so easy to identify as soldiers while off-duty. 26 In one riveting incident early in 2009 in Ciudad Judrez, drug traffickers demanded the resignation of police chief Roberto Ordufia Cruz, and vowed to kill one police officer every 48 hours until he resigned. 27 They carried out the threat by killing the deputy chief of the department, another police officer, and a prison guard. 28 Ordufia resigned after a few days. 29 The government's stated strategy was to focus more of its limited law enforcement resources on small-time sellers of drugs. 37 In the United States, concern about Mexico intensified. 38 The legalization of certain drug possession prompted worries that greater drug use would spread to the United States, as easy access 31 See Lacey, supra note 10. 32 
III. Movement Away From the Inquisitorial System in Mexico
Which legal actors and institutions in Mexico can respond to such drug violence? The relevant players in Mexican criminal justice, and their capacity to respond to crime, are changing just as rapidly as the drug violence in the country.
Mexico, broadly speaking, draws on the civil law tradition, which employs an inquisitorial model of criminal justice. 42 Like much of Latin America, Mexico inherited its procedural template from Spain. 43 Today, however, Mexico offers a different take on the civil law system than most other Latin American countries. 44 The distinctions between the Mexican model and the inquisitorial 
A. The Traditional Latin American Model
The classic Latin American inquisitorial codes contain two features that distinguish them from systems that tend to be more adversarial. 46 First, the Latin American criminal codes generally provide a written process that accumulates evidence over time, as opposed to an oral process that concentrates proof into a shorter time frame.
47 Second, the inquisitorial codes assure the quality of evidence through professional standards of the investigating officer-that is, the judge-rather than through a testing of the evidence from the defendant armed with several pre-declared rights, or through presentation of evidence to lay adjudicators such as jurors. 48 Latin American inquisitorial codes typically divide the criminal process into two stages: A pretrial investigation (sumario 45 or instrucci6n) and a verdict and sentencing phase (plenario or juicio). 49 The keystone of the process during both phases is the dossier (expediente) "that the police and investigating judge compile." 5 "
The judge takes charge of the investigation, which is "kept secret from the defendant and [the defense] attorney." 5 The defense has no right to be present during the production of evidence or to be apprised of charges before being interrogated; with limited exceptions, pretrial detention of the defendant is obligatory. 52 In theory, the prosecutors hold no charging discretion, so every time the police or judges learn about a possible offense, they have to initiate criminal proceedings. 53 At the verdict phase, the same judge who supervised the investigation phase remains in control of the case. 54 At this point, the defendant and her attorney gain full access to the written dossier and can request the production of evidence. 55 The verdict phrase is still "predominantly written [and] de facto [remains] secret from the public." 56 The resolution of factual disputes does not include a jury. 57 
B. The Traditional Mexican Model
In Mexico, the central distinguishing feature of the system is the expansive role of the public prosecutors. 58 Mexican prosecutors at the state and federal levels oversee police, investigations, and prosecutions. 59 investigating judge, as they would in the traditional Latin American model. 6°I n general, Mexican prosecutors face less competition from other institutions than do prosecutors in other systems in the Western hemisphere. 61 Compared to prosecutors in the United States, Mexican prosecutors do not face an especially active or empowered defense bar. 62 Compared to other Latin American prosecutors, the prosecutors in Mexico do not defer to judges in the overall conduct of investigations. 63 Granted, at the trial stage, the prosecutorial role in the traditional Mexican model is more limited than during investigation. 64 Judges in the trial stage render written decisions based on codes, applied mostly to written submissions of facts by the prosecutor and defense counsel. 65 The cases are decided in camera. 66 In Mexico, a prosecutor need only show "sufficient evidence of the crime," not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 6 7 The results that these institutions have achieved in Mexico have not been especially encouraging. Many human rights groups have chronicled the ills of Mexico's criminal justice system over the last two decades. 68 Some common themes appear in these reports: Corruption of officials, impunity of criminals, and inaccurate evidence. 69 These problems do not flow inevitably from the inquisitorial heritage of the Mexican system, but one can see the connection between the most common malfunctions of the system and the lack of a counterweight to prosecutors, particularly at the investigative stage. 70 Take, for instance, the perennial problems of bribery and corruption. The prosecutors' dominant role in both investigation and adjudication leads some of them to slight personal liberty protections. 71 The system, built around an assumption of professional competence of a government official, leaves prosecutors (and police, judges, customs officials, and prison administrators) susceptible to bribery and corruption. 72 The Mexican system leaves far too many crimes undiscovered, with too many criminals untouched. There is a widespread perception among Mexican citizens, confirmed in survey after survey, that the system actors do not reliably investigate reports of crimes. 73 Even when investigations occur, the system ultimately produces few convictions. 74 Some attribute this inefficiency to the mandatory prosecution rule, which prevents officials from prioritizing cases in a rational way, leading to an overloaded system that allows bribery and other corruption to determine which cases drop out of the system. 75 Others suggest that the slow accumulation of proof in a primarily written system prevents efficient case processing, meaning that the cases take so long to wind through the system that prosecutors and judges lose their urgency by the time the cases emerge from the end of the assembly line. 76 Finally, the Mexican system relies too often on inaccurate evidence and coerced testimony. 77 The system offers defendants no jury trial and other due process protections designed to test the origins and accuracy of evidence. The presumption of regularity and professionalism allows cases to go forward without regular checks. 79 In Mexico, this opens the way for torture by police to obtain confessions, meaning that some convictions are based on coerced confessions and other false evidence. 8 " Why doesn't the defendant stop this from happening? Defense lawyers are generally precluded from confronting accusers and witnesses before the trial judge, leaving them with little opportunity to challenge corrupted evidence."
In addition, defense counsel (especially appointed public counsel) are too often limited in what they can offer any single client because of their large caseloads. 8 2
C. Mexican Code Revisions
While complaints about bribery, impunity, and coerced confessions have dogged the Mexican system for many years, some astonishing changes have appeared recently in Mexico's criminal courts. 83 The Mexican Congress amended the Constitution in 2007 and 2008 to require each Mexican state to study some proposed reforms and to implement them within the state systems. 4 In HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 17-18 ("So few cases make it to the courts because the investigations are not successful."). 86 Mexico designated Proderecho (a "rule of law entity") to coordinate reforms. 87 The government looked to the United States for help with reforms, so the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is funding Proderecho and several training programs for system actors. 88 Funding came through the Meridd Initiative, named for the city in the Yucain that was the location for 2007 talks between Presidents Calder6n and Bush, leading to this funding agreement. 89 The first reform projects were based in the states of Chihuahua, Oaxaca, and Nuevo Le6n. 90 The emphasis there was on developing advocacy skills for prosecutors and defense attorneys to use at oral proceedings during the trial stage. 9 ' After suitable training, lawyers on both sides are now able to question accusers, witnesses, experts, and others. 92 They engage in oral advocacy on the admissibility of evidence, guilt, and sentencing. 93 These reforms emphasize strong educational programs not only for the advocates, but also for judges, court personnel, police and investigators. 94 Most of Mexico's remaining states are reviewing and 
D. Framing the Code Revisions
It is possible to frame these collected reforms as a movement away from an inquisitorial system, toward the adversarial model of criminal justice associated with the United Kingdom and the United States. 99 Some of these reforms do indeed move Mexico away from a written procedure, toward a system that relies more on oral presentation of evidence in a public forum.'° They transform the role of defense counsel, giving the attorney more legal tools, such as due process rights that offer a basis for challenging the legitimacy of the investigation and prosecution. 10 Such a framing of the reform movement might explain why the United States government has funded and endorsed the use of familiar institutions in Mexico.' 0 2 This framing, however, misses just as much as it reveals. It takes a convoluted account of inquisitorial justice to explain why moves designed to involve judges more heavily in investigations should be considered a move in the direction of adversarial justice. 102 See Hendrix, supra note 85, at 114 (noting that part of the Merida funding in Mexico will go towards strengthening the institutions ofjustice). 103 See generally Langer, supra note 43 (presenting a detailed examination of the reform movement).
[Vol. XXXV The role changes for institutional actors in Mexico bring the system closer to other Latin American systems that have crafted a distinctive "accusatorial" system, a model that alters several key features of the classic inquisitorial system without fully embracing the common law model."0 The inspiration for procedural reform in Mexico may be arriving from the South, at least as much as from the North.' 05 The reworking of institutional roles in Mexican criminal justice can best be understood as a balance-of-power operationcreating a competition among the actors where monopoly power once existed-not just an endorsement of a particular adversarial method of resolving factual disputes. 1°6 A purely adversarial reform in Mexico would build a system around an oral trial, with evidence presented by two parties of equal power and opposite interests, decided by judges and juries who remain neutral between those parties. 0 7 What is happening in Mexico, however, goes beyond the trial. The new codes limit the central importance of the prosecutor during the investigative phase. They involve the public in the investigation and trial phases by creating more open hearings and open records. 1 08 They shift more responsibility into the hands of defense attorneys. 1 0 9
While judges lose some authority over the presentation of evidence in the trial phase, they counterbalance the prosecutor during the investigative phase and retain the power to evaluate evidence at trial and to sentence offenders. The new codes enhance the distinction between the perspective and function of the prosecutor and the judge, increasing the odds that these two 104 See id. at 621 (outlining the central aspects of the accusatorial system). 105 See id. at 621-26 (suggesting that Mexico reflects "triangular diffusion" of procedural concepts, starting from periphery, moving to center of developed nations for funding and endorsement, and back to periphery actors will in fact compete with one another more often."' On the whole, these reforms in Mexico make the field more crowded. They offer more actors the power to influence the outcome at more stages of the criminal process. In this sense, Mexico is moving in the opposite direction from criminal justice systems in the United States, where competition for the administrative power of the prosecutor becomes more slight with each generation."'
IV. Cause-Effect Relationship Between Drug Violence and Procedural Reforms in Mexico
The fact that Mexico has embarked on transformative procedural changes at the very time that drug violence is testing the legitimacy of government raises deep questions about the connection between the law and the society it serves."' Did the violence cause the procedural change? Consider two hypotheses, each offering a different causation story.
First, we will consider the "inevitability hypothesis." According to this view, procedural reform would have happened with or without the drug violence, and the fact that they occurred at the same moment is simply a coincidence." 3 Second, we will examine the "violence-as-causation" hypothesis. According to this account, the extraordinary drug violence of 2007 made possible a sweeping set of procedural changes." 4 The violence was necessary to motivate actors to embrace major change." 5 The initiative against drug cartels and the effort to revamp criminal 
A. The Inevitability Hypothesis
Taking in the broad sweep of Mexican history, perhaps the criminal code revisions are happening now because of larger changes in the social structure." 7 In this view, the appearance of vivid crime problems is only a distraction; these procedural changes were inevitable. 118 It is commonplace among lawyers and scholars based in accusatorial systems to note that the inquisitorial systems are based on a relationship of trust between citizens and government agents. 1 9 As a society becomes less homogenous, it will embrace more explicit declarations of rights and insist on more active checks on official power rather than relying on professionalism and tradition. 2 In this telling, accusatorial justice inevitably arrives in the wake of democracy and social diversity. 2 ' The loss of the PRI monopoly on political power with the election of Vicente Fox in 2000 signaled the arrival of a more pluralistic and democratically competitive nation.1 22 It was only a matter of time before the justice system, with its obvious flaws, reflected this larger social change.
Mdximo Langer offers a similar account of procedural reforms in other Latin American countries.1 2 Fourteen Latin American countries have introduced criminal procedural reforms in the last fifteen years. 1 24 An active network of Latin American lawyers and other experts drafted and implemented the codes, structuring the changes as a movement away from inquisitorial procedures and toward accusatorial procedures. 125 The network experts emphasized that this was a regional trend, and thus created a code "cascade effect."' 2 6 Reform supporters had differing political orientations, with different priorities for the problems that accusatorial reforms should address.' 27 Legislatures considered the reforms to be technical, deriving from legal expert committees. 128 Mostly they were adopted with little opposition." 2 9
In the end, countries embraced the reforms when governance and public debate became more democratically competitive. 3°M exico was slow to move to embrace accusatorial justice because it was slower than Argentina and other Latin American nations to develop a democratically competitive political culture.' 3 '
Granting the explanatory power of this view of the connection between legal institutions and the political pluralism of a society, it all seemed to operate too promptly in Mexico. Perhaps the Calder6n government thought of the offensive against drug cartels and the revamping of the criminal justice systems as two parts of a comprehensive strategy to promote order and the rule of law. 136 The level of violence after the 2006 elections produced a clear need for the government to take visible action to fix a broken system. 137 The use of an accusatorial framework was a way to signal profound change internally,' 38 and to encourage help and endorsement from external sources.' 39 Externally, the embrace of the "accusatorial" label makes the Mexican procedural changes accessible and attractive to funding sources in the United States. 140 The USAID funding targeted both the law enforcement functions and the "rule of law" functions. 4 ' Funding goes to civilian agencies for technical advice and training to strengthen institutions of justice: Vetting for new police force members; case management software to track investigations through trial,; new offices of citizen complaints and professional responsibility; and witness protection programs. 1 42 At the same time, the accusatorial packaging of these reforms appealed to a broader external network of Latin American lawyers, judges, and activists, who aimed for more active defense and prosecution involvement in testing of evidence at trial, and more discretion for prosecutors and judges to prioritize among cases."' The language of a party-centered adversarial criminal process long ago arrived in Mexico from the South, not from the North.
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Criminal code revisions could also serve some useful internal functions for the Calder6n government. First, a more accusatorial process seemed the well-targeted answer for the problem of 135 Tougher law enforcement must operate together "with a justice system that can more quickly and broadly prosecute and punish criminals." ' 146 Increased arrests must be matched by "increased case loads to avoid the appearance of criminal impunity."' 47 The accusatorial system, with its emphasis on prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining, offers a way to expand the reach of the system.' 48 For instance, "in Mexico's first week of ... oral trials in the State of Chihuahua, seventy percent of forty-eight reviewed cases were resolved through one of the seven case resolution alternatives permitted by the reformed criminal codes of procedure."' 49 Before the code reforms, these cases could have gone on indefinitely. 150 Accusatorial reforms could also target the loss of public confidence in the Mexican system.' 5 ' It can be said that "Mexicans long ago lost faith in their judicial authorities.' '152 A study reported in the New York Times found that "ninety percent of those who have been victims of a crime never reported the episode to the authorities, convinced it would do no good.'
153
Studies have also found that less than four out of every 100 people arrested are actually convicted.' 54 A system that depends more on lay adjudicators and public oral trials could demonstrate to its citizens that the system answers to their priorities." ' The legitimacy of government in the eyes of the publicincluding those who are the targets of government punishments- test a full and accurate factual record. 1 60 While there is no inherent advantage in the package of new procedures that Mexico is now embracing, the newness of these procedures offers an advantage. Just as it was important to replace police officers in Mexico-perceived as corrupt at every levelwith more widely-trusted soldiers from the armed forces, so it is important to replace an older, distrusted judicial system with something that is perceived as a clean sweep.1 6 ' In the long run, replacement of police forces with armed forces might create more problems than it solves, but the move does reset an intolerable status quo. 162 The same might be said of criminal code revisions that create more charging discretion and open the door for more plea bargaining. 163
V. Conclusion: Federalism and the Legitimacy Question in Mexico
There is an encouraging and intriguing aspect of the foundational procedural changes happening in Mexico: which will allow for some direct comparisons. Since the thirty-three Mexican states will all eventually try their own reform packages, we can compare results among states. 1 65 The reforms have started in three states and will spread to others quickly. 166 If one Mexican state employs jury trials and others do not, we may very well be able to notice any effects on crime rates and legitimacy of the system. 1 67 Furthermore, such comparisons are likely to happen in Mexico, because of the involvement of U.S. experts and funding sources for training purposes.
16 8 Many will be watching to see whether the Mexican states start to operate, for better or worse, more like the state-level systems in the United States.' 6 9
Finally, we must keep ourselves open to the discouraging possibility that the comparisons will not matter. i0 What if procedural variety all leads to the same unhappy results in crime control and legitimate outcomes? 17 ' As lawyers and legal scholars, we must remain humble enough to say that when this many people are dying, it may not matter whether the system is accusatorial or inquisitorial.172 169 See Mexico's New Justice, supra note 155, at A22. 170 See Lacey, supra note 10, at Al. 171 See id. 172 See id.
